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a 
right to a 
a 
asserts 
by the United States and Idaho Constitutions, was 
violated because of the prosecutor's misconduct in this case. Specifically, Mr. Nelson 
asserts the prosecutor struck multiple "foul blows" during closing argument by 
impermissibly vouching for the investigating officer and the prosecutor and by appealing 
to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury, and this prosecutorial misconduct 
amounted to fundamental error. 
1 
child 
The filed a Criminal Complaint 




by lewd or 




(R., pp.1 3.) After Mr. waived his preliminary hearing, 
§ 18-1508A(1)(a). 
magistrate bound 
him over to the district court (R., pp.30-31.) The State then a Prosecuting 
Attorney's Information charging Mr. Nelson with the above two offenses. (R., pp.32-33.) 
The later the the 
the sexual battery count. (R., pp.35, 43-47.) Mr. Nelson entered a not guilty plea. 
(R., pp.51-52.) 
The matter proceeded to a jury (R., pp.106-14.) During voir dire, another 
judge as a 1 15 - 108, 7.) 
1 
remove d 
(Tr., 150, - p.1 13.) jury that a days 
hang with K.M. at Mr. Nelson's house, and Mr. Nelson played Truth or 
159, L.14, p.162, L.1 - p.166, in Mr. Nelson's basement. (Tr., p.1 L.24 -
During the game, Mr. Nelson had C.F. touch Mr. Nelson's penis through his 
and outside his clothing (Tr., p.166, L.16- p.172, L.2, p.174, L.2 - p.175, L.25.) 
also testified he thought Mr. Nelson touched C.F.'s penis through his pants. 
(Tr., 177, L.7- p.178, L.4.) 
C. further testified that when he was seventeen years old, Mr. Nelson got him 
Nelson's downstairs bedroom and started fondling C. 's penis. (Tr., p.201, 
p.203, 12 - p.205, L.25.) Mr. Nelson manually masturbated them both 
were in contact. (Tr., p.206, 7.) 
testified that when he was seventeen years he was Mr. Nelson's 
bathroom when Mr. Nelson persuaded him to have Mr. Nelson trim his pubic hair. 
(Tr., p.189, Ls.8-18, p.191, L.1 - p.194, L.18, p.201, Ls.9-14.) C.F. stated that while 
Mr. Nelson was cutting the hair around C.F.'s testicles, he cut C.F.'s scrotum with his 
scissors. (See , p.194, L.19 - p.195, L.3.) Mr. Nelson then put C.F.'s penis in his 
mouth. (Tr., p.195, Ls.3-6, p.197, Ls.7-8.) C.F. testified the incident in the bathroom 
was the last instance of sexual contact he had with Mr. Nelson. (Tr., p.200, Ls.18-25.) 
C.F. testified there were two or three other times when Mr. Nelson put C.F.'s 




, p.220, L.21 - p.228, 1.) They called the and C. 
mother. 
a forensic 
interview and then spoke with Detective John Marley of the Idaho Falls Police 
Department. (Tr., p.229, L.25 - p.232, 12; see Tr., p.292, L.21 - p.293, L.7.) 
On cross-examination, testified he might have told the forensic 
he was sixteen during the bathroom incident. (Tr., p.255, Ls.8-11.) He also 
testified that he did not tell the forensic that Mr. Nelson cut his scrotum 
during the bathroom incident. (Tr., p.260, L.19 p.261, 18.) Additionally, C.F. did not 
remember telling the interviewer about the two or three other instances where 




(Tr., p.266, Ls.8-20.) 
On seen the forensic interview. 
(Tr., p.272, Ls.21-23.) testified the prosecutor told him not to review the forensic 
interview or police report, because prosecutor wanted C. 's testimony to be based 
on honesty and sincerity. (Tr., p.273, Ls.3-21.) 
The investigating officer, Detective testified that he attended C.F.'s 
forensic interview and watched it via television. (Tr., p.298, L.11 - p.299, L.22.) He 
then tried to have a confrontation call with Mr. Nelson, but never completed a call. 






incident (Tr., 310, 
a 
11, .) 
When Detective Marley asked questions on whether Mr. Nelson had even been alone 
C. , Mr. Nelson stated C.F. one time had cupped his genitals while C.F. was 
intoxicated. (Tr., p.311, 11 - p.313, L.7.) According to Detective Marley, Mr. Nelson 
stated he later spoke with C. in his bedroom about that incident, and C.F. had no 
memory of it because he was . (Tr., p.313, 8 - p.314, L.4.) 
Detective Marley testified he also told Mr. Nelson that C.F. had disclosed the 
basement incident during the forensic interview. (Tr., p.315, L.18 - p.316, L.4.) 
Nelson denied any sexual or any knowledge the Truth or Dare game. 
316, Ls.5-6.) 
The investigating officer testified he brought the bathroom incident, and 
Mr. Nelson at first denied going into the bathroom or having any contact with C.F. in that 
way. (Tr., p.316, L.10 - p.317, 1.) Detective Marley testified Mr. Nelson later 
changed his story and admitted to agreeing to trim C.F.'s pubic hair. (Tr., p.317, L.2 -
p.318, L.1.) According to Detective Marley, Mr. Nelson stated he trimmed C.F.'s pubic 
hair, but he did not believe he was touching C.F. in a sexual manner. (Tr., p.318, L.2 -
p.319, L.7.) Detective Marley told Mr. Nelson he did not believe one could trim 
somebody's pubic hair without touching their genitals in a sexual way. (Tr., p.319, Ls.8-
12.) Mr. Nelson eventually stated he had manual contact with C.F.'s genitals, and that 
4 
on 's a 1 1, 
. (Tr., 
audio had recorded, he his 
, p.329, - p.330, L.7.) After the video of the interview was admitted and 
were played for the jury, Detective Marley testified the video 
making a trimming motion with his hands when 
's pubic hair. (Tr., p.331, - p.339, L.10.) 
depicted 
trimming 
cross-examination regarding the video excerpts, Marley testified he 
could not Mr. Nelson was talking about when Mr. Nelson made several other 
hand gestures excerpts from the video of the interview. (Tr., p.340, L.24 -
L 12.) 
., a 
drinking with in car 
to over. , p.360, - p 1, , p.369, 
p. L.25.) Robin Nelson, Mr. Nelson's wife, testified that nothing about C.F.'s and 
Nelson's behavior stood when they were around each 
Mr. Nelson were never alone when she was at the house. (Tr., 377, 
p.385, L.7 - p.386, 11.) 
and C.F. and 
- p.378, L.3, 
Mr. Nelson testified that C. would regularly visit the Nelsons' home after he and 
K.M. became friends, and that C. even lived them for about a month. (Tr., p.404, 




never asked C.F. penis over pants, and he never pulled his 
had C.F. touch it. (Tr., 15, 10-15.) Mr. Nelson further testified that 
he never asked C.F. to rub his penis while in the garage, never rubbed C.F.'s penis over 
pants, and never engaged in mutual masturbation with C.F. while alone in 
Nelson's bedroom. (Tr., p.415, L.17 - p.417, L.10.) He stated C.F. had cupped him 
and about a week later he had a talk with C.F. alone in the bedroom about the 
incident and C. did not remember the incident because he had been intoxicated. 
(Tr., p.416, Ls.4-21.) 
Mr. Nelson also testified he asked C.F. to stop coming over after K.M. told him 
an incident where C. had been drinking and driving with K.M. in the car. 
17,L.11-p.418, 15.) F.came to Nelson'shouseaboutaweek 
and after Mr. Nelson told him to leave, 
(Tr., p.419, Ls.3-23.) 
called Mr. Nelson a child molester. 
Mr. Nelson testified that when he had the interview with Detective Marley, he was 
floored when Detective Marley stated C.F. had made sexual allegations. (Tr., p.421, 
11 - p.422, L.10.) Mr. Nelson told the investigating officer there was nothing he knew 
of that could be misinterpreted as being sexual. (Tr., p.424, Ls.8-14.) Detective Marley 
gave Mr. Nelson more and more information about the allegations as the interview 
continued. (Tr., p.424, L.15 - p.425, L.1.) Mr. Nelson told Detective Marley he had only 
been alone once with C.F. (Tr., p.427, Ls.9-19.) He did not tell Detective Marley he 
performed oral sex on C.F., nor did he state he offered to trim C.F.'s pubic hair. 
6 
's 
hair as n 
hand gesture was (Tr., 5-23.) 
remember what the other hand gestures concerned. (Tr., p.431, L.24 p.432, L.5.) 
Nelson had explained to C.F. different to trim his pubic hair, but never offered 
trim C.F.'s pubic haif. (Tr., p.434, 2.) 
On cross-examination, Mr. Nelson 
was lying about the 
Nelson said. (Tr., p.443, Ls.2-7.) Mr. 
that he was not saying Detective 
he may have misunderstood what 
agreed the suggestion that Detective 
Marley would misunderstand a like putting your mouth on a juvenile's penis 
would sound ridiculous in some cases. (Tr., 1 1.) Nelson later testified 
on that was when told 
him he trimmed 's hair at C.F.'s request, and that the scissor hand motions 
video were when r. Nelson described about trimming pubic hair with 
C. (Tr., p.452, L.22 - p.454, L.2.) He did not tel! Detective Marley there was sexual 
contact in the bathroom or that he performed oral sex on C.F. (Tr., p.454, L.14 - p.455, 
L.7.) On redirect examination, Nelson testified the advice he C.F. about 
trimming pubic hair was supposed to be funny, not serious. (Tr., p.470, Ls.9-16.) 
While the jury was deliberating, they submitted a jury question asking: "What 
happens if some say guilty and some say innocent?" (Tr., p.513, Ls.14-16.) The district 




of of a to seventeen age (lewd or 
lascivious acts). (R., p.103; Tr., p.51 - p.520, L.11.) The district judge who had 
been a prospective juror also presided over the reading of the jury verdict. (Tr., p.519, 
Ls.2-6.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended the district court impose a 
unified sentence of twenty-five years, with five to ten years fixed at the district court's 
discretion. (Tr., p. , Ls.15-23.) Mr. Nelson recommended the district court consider 
a suspended sentence with a term of probation of about ten years; or retained 
jurisdiction; or, if sentence were , a unified sentence of ten years, with around 
two years fixed. (Tr., p.542, L.20 - p.543, 18.) The district court imposed a unified 
twenty-five years, fixed. (R., pp.170-71; , p.562, Ls.6-
10.) 
Mr. Nelson then filed a timely Idaho Criminal Rule 35 ("Rule 35") motion for a 
reduction of sentence. (R., pp.183-85.) After conducting a hearing, the district court 
denied the Rule 35 hearing. (Tr., p.565, L.3 - p.572, L.12.) 
Mr. Nelson filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's judgment of 
conviction and the denial of the Rule 35 motion. 1 (R., pp.188-92.) 
1 On appeal, 
Rule 35 motion. 
Nelson not challenge the district denial of the 
8 
9 
Nelson asserts State violated his right a trial, guaranteed by the 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 
of the Idaho Constitution, by committing multiple acts prosecutorial misconduct during 
closing argument. Mr. Nelson asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct during 
closing argument by vouching for the credibility of the investigating officer and the 
and by appealing to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury. These 
prosecutorial "foul blows" committed during closing arguments amounted to 
fundamental error and this Court should vacate Mr. Nelson's conviction in light of 
misconduct. 
Standard Of Review 
Nelson did not object in the district court to 
during closing argument (See generally Tr., p.483, 
of the prosecutor's comments 
- p.501, L.6.) As the Idaho 
Supreme Court has held, "[w]here prosecutorial misconduct was not objected to at trial, 
Idaho appellate courts may only order a reversal when the defendant demonstrates that 
as fundamental error." State v. 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). 
Fundamental error review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the defendant bears 
the burden of showing that the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's 
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
not contained in the appellate information as 




amends. V & XIV § 1; Idaho Const. 
proceedings. U Const. 
I§ 13. Idaho Court has held that, 
"[w]hiie our system of criminal justice is adversarial in nature, and the prosecutor is 
0 v,"' 0 ,..,·r0 r1 to be diligent and leave no stone unturned, he is nevertheless expected and 
required to be fair." State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 62 (2011) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). But a court reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct "must 
keep in mind the realities of trial. A fair trial is not necessarily a perfect trial." Id. 
(citation omitted). 
While a prosecutor "may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones." 
State v. Wilbanks, 95 Idaho 346, 354 (1973) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 
88 (1935) misconduct occurs 
when the prosecutor "attempts 
evidence admitted during trial, including 
on any factor other than . . . 
inferences that may be drawn from 
that evidence," or when the prosecutor "[a]ppeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the 
jury through use of inflammatory tactics." State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, _, 348 
P.3d 1, 81-82 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The prosecutor's comments at issue here all took place during closing argument. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that "[c]losing argument serves to sharpen and 
clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of fact in a criminal case." State v. Gross, 
146 Idaho 15, 18 (Ct. App. 2008). The purpose of dosing argument "is to enlighten the 








error only if the comments were so egregious or inflammatory that any 
consequent prejudice could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial court 
informing the jury that the comments should be disregarded." Abdullah, 158 Idaho at 
_, 348 P.3d at 59 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
of 
or 
1. Violation Of The Constitutional Right To A Fair Trial 
The first prong of fundamental error review here asks whether the prosecutor 
Mr. Nelson's constitutional right to a fair trial by committing misconduct. 
asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct by vouching for the credibility 
investigating officer the and by appealing to emotion, passion 
of the jury. 
a. Vouching For The Credibility Of The Investigating Officer 
Mr. Nelson asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct by vouching for the 
credibility of the investigating officer. During closing argument, the prosecutor argued 
that, with respect to the interview of Mr. Nelson conducted by Detective Marley, "[s]o 
then we get down to Detective Marley is lying, or the defendant is lying Right?" 
(Tr., p.493, Ls.1-3.) The prosecutor continued: "I mean, we're dealing-now-so let's 
walk through that a step at a time. Let's say-and I'm trying to do this very objectively, 
because the absurdity to suggest that Detective Marley would lie about this makes my 




a by placing prestige of state behind or referring to 
information not given the jury that supports the witness." State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 
364, 369 (Ct. App. 2010). 
The United States Supreme Court has explained that the prosecutor's vouching 
for the credibility of witnesses poses two dangers: first, "such comments can convey the 
impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, 
supports the charges against the defendant and can thus jeopardize the defendant's 
right to a fair trial," and second, "the prosecutor's opinion carries with it imprimatur of 
the Government and may induce the jury trust the Government's judgment rather 
than its own United v. Young, 470 U 1, 1 9 (1985). 
the prosecutor vouched for the credibility of Marley by 
expressing a personal belief as the credibility of Detective Marley that was not based 
on inferences from evidence presented at trial. The prosecutor urged the jury to believe 
Detective Marley not because of the evidence presented at trial, but "because the 
absurdity to suggest Detective Marley would lie about this makes my skin crawl." (See 
Tr., p.493, Ls.5-8.) The prosecutor expressed his personal belief as to the credibility of 
Detective Marley, and that personal belief was based not on inferences from evidence 
presented on trial but on the prosecutor's own visceral reaction. See Adamcik, 152 
Idaho at 481-82. Thus, the prosecutor committed misconduct. See Gross, 146 Idaho at 
19-20. 
13 
of police "but that's 
said. The stories match up with regard to the defendant's 
acknowledged, but [Detective ]Marley's lying to you." (See Tr., p.494, Ls.13-18.) The 
prosecutor then argued: "Well, if he's lying to you-I don't mean to sound terrible, but I 
can do a better job. I mean, if you want me to lie to you, we can do a better job. 
Okay?" (Tr., p.494, Ls.18-21.) According to the prosecutor, "I mean, he can sit here 
he admitted this, this, this. He even us where Jimmy Hoffa's buried. 
Okay? He can tell you all of that. That's what he can do, but it's not the truth." 
(Tr., p.494, Ls.21-24.) Further, the prosecutor argued, "[a]nd to suggest he's lying 
when lie could easily have been much better . " (Tr., p.494, 
1.) 
The prosecutor's comments on how can a job" in coming up with a 
aligned Detective Marley with the prosecutor and emphasized the prosecutor and the 
witness were working together on the same team. The prosecutor argued both he and 
the investigating officer were capable of telling "better" lies, and therefore the jury 
should believe the account of prosecutor and Detective Marley. (See Tr., p.494, 
L.13 - p.495, L 1.) Those comments are akin to the comments of the prosecutor in 
Gross, where the prosecutor "suggest[ed] that the jury should trust and believe the 
officer and prosecutor because they represented the state and, therefore, must be 
ethical." See Gross, 146 idaho at 19-20. The Idaho Court of Appeals in Gross held the 
prosecutor's comments, by arguing "the jury should believe the story of the officer and 
14 
were 
case was more 
a that the 
Marley they were representatives of 
State, inducing the jury "to trust the Government's judgment rather than its own view of 
evidence." See Young, 470 U.S. at 18-19. 
The prosecutor's comments on can do a job" in coming up with a 
also referred to facts not in evidence. Compare Gross, 146 Idaho 20 (holding that 
comments, that "I would 
job" if they presented altered 
my job" and "[t]he arresting officer would lose 
to facts not in evidence), with 
Wheeler, 149 Idaho 369 (holding the prosecutor's comments on "[i]s [the officer] 
to risk his career to make did not expressly a fact not in 
was an a common sense 
determination). By declaring that and the investigating 
do a better job in lying, prosecutor expressly referred to facts not in 
evidence. See Gross, 146 Idaho at 20. Thus, the prosecutor's comments 
were misconduct. 
c. Appealing To The Emotion, Passion Or Prejudice Of The Jury 
Mr. Nelson further asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct by appealing to 
the emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury. Specifically, the prosecutor invited the jury 
to imagine themselves as the alleged victim. During closing argument, the prosecutor 
CF was credible even though his on what happened 
contained discrepancies on the number of incidents of sexual contact. (See Tr., p.488, 
15 
12 11.) 's on d 
in came 
11.) The prosecutor continued: 
There was differences on amount of times. I mean, can you imagine 
going in-we've discussed this forensic interview. It was discussed 
briefly. But can you imagine going in, your mom's brought you to the 
police station, you've given a little snippet of what's going on, and you sit 
down in front of some handsome young lady, and you've just turned 18, 
and you're sitting in front of some lady, and she's asking you about all of 
the sexual activity you did with a 40-something-year-old. 
, p.489, Ls.12-21.) The prosecutor argued he was not suggesting C.F. "was trying to 
deceptive to her. What I am suggesting, you think he's going to hold some things 
You think he's going to not acknowledge, or not understand? Or maybe his 
memory's just simply different. Which would you prefer? That's always the issue." 
, p.489, L.22 - p.490, L.2.) 
Idaho Court has held: "[A]ppeals emotion, or prejudice 
jury through use of inflammatory are impermissible. Ellington, 151 Idaho 
62. Gross, the prosecutor the members of the jury "to image themselves as 
a hypothetical victim of Grass's alleged drunk driving and asserting that 'his client's 
wanted to protect the members of the jury from becoming that hypothetical victim." 
Gross, 146 Idaho at 20-21. The prosecutor's comments "did not ask the jury to rely on 
evidence, but, rather, urged the jury to find Gross guilty of the DUI charge based on 
a fear of being the victim of a drinking and driving accident serious enough to be on the 
front page of a newspaper." Id. at 21. The Idaho Court of Appeals held those 
comments improperly appealed to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through 
the use of inflammatory tactics. Id. 
16 
it a some 
is also 
v. Cherry, A.2d 800, 1977) (holding 
prosecutor's statement asking the jurors to imagine themselves as crime victims and 
imagine the difficulty State's key witness had in testifying "improperly invoked 
sympathy of the jurors for" the witness, "suggested that the jury should render a 
based on sympathy for the witness rather than guilt or innocence of the 
accused," and prejudiced the defendant); Commonwealth v. Olmande, 995 N. 797, 
1 (Mass. App. 2013) ("[T]he defendant alleges the prosecutor, in effect, instructed the 
to place themselves in [the alleged victim's] shoes by asking them to 'image' 
speaking about the incident a sexual assault 'to a group strangers.' agree. It 
is into 
arouse juror sympathy."); State v. McDaniel, E.2d 882, 883-84 (S.C. Ct. App. 
1995) (holding that the use of "'you' or a form of 'you' some forty-five times, 
asking the jury to put themselves in the place of the victim" during an alleged rape, while 
it to the police, and while testifying at trial, was reversible error). 
Here, the prosecutor invoked jury sympathy by inviting the jury to step into 
shoes of the alleged , C. , at the time he reported the alleged offenses to the 
forensic interviewer. The prosecutor's comments did not ask the jury to find C.F. 
credible despite the discrepancies in his testimony, and thus find Mr. Nelson guilty, on 
the basis of the evidence presented at trial. Rather, the comments urged the jury to find 
Mr. Nelson guilty based on imagining themselves being placed in C. 's position and 
17 
use 
tactics. See Gross, 146 Idaho at 20-21. 
the prosecutor's comments for the credibility of the prosecutor 
investigating officer and appealed to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury by 
asking the jury to imagine themselves as the alleged victim, the prosecutor 
misconduct that violated Mr. Nelson's constitutional right to a fair trial. 
2. Plain Error 
second prong of fundamental error 




for prosecutorial misconduct asks 
need for any additional information not 
as to whether the failure to 
was a tactical decision. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. Here, it cannot be said 
failure to object was a tactical decision. With respect to the prosecutor's 
comments vouching for the credibility of prosecutor and the investigating 
failure to object not provide a possible tactical advantage. Rather, the 
placing the prestige of the State the witness, see Wheeler, 149 
at 369, left the defense at a tactical disadvantage by suggesting the jury should 
the prosecutor and investigating officer based on considerations outside the 
evidence presented at trial. 
Further, with respect to the prosecutor's comments appealing to the emotion, 
passion or prejudice of the jury, it was not possible that counsel's failure to object was a 
tactical decision. C.F's credibility 'vVas central to the State's case. (See, e.g., Tr., p.489, 
- p.490, L.14 (arguing that C.F. was not being dishonest despite the discrepancies 
18 
L.13 - 7 was more 
was 
and Nelson guilty inviting the into the shoes of F., 
failure to object on this core cannot be as a tactical 
not draw further attention to the passing reference." Cf. State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 
533, 543 (Ct. App. 2012) (holding counsel's failure to object to a prosecutor's statement 
"attempt[ing] to describe the scene-albeit from the victim's perspective" was possibly a 








of C. was central to the 
(See, e.g., Tr., p.492, L.1 - p.493, L.3.) The its case would hinge on 
jury's (See, e.g., Tr., p.512, Ls.19-20 (arguing during 
argument rebuttal, "[aJs I said from the beginning, out who's lying to you, 
and you your verdict").) Otherwise, State's evidence was not overwhelming. 
example, C. 's account of what happened contained numerous discrepancies. 
(See, e.g., Tr., p.255, Ls.8-11, p.260, L.19 - p.261, L.18, p.265, Ls.8-22, p.266, Ls.8-
20.) Additionaliy, without the audio from the police interview with Mr. Nelson (see 
Tr., p.327, L.22 - p.329, L.16), the State could not conclusively show Detective Marley's 
account of the interview was as opposed to Mr. Nelson's alternative account. 
19 
the to and thus find 
guilty, "based on factors evidence." Gross, 146 Idaho 21. 
prejudiced Mr. Nelson's case because, individually, each instance of misconduct 
was "so egregious or inflammatory that any consequent prejudice could not have 
remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury that the comments 
should be disregarded." See Abdullah, 158 Idaho at , 348 P.3d at 59 (internal 
marks omitted). Considered individually, of misconduct by the 
prejudiced Mr. Nelson's case and therefore constituted fundamental error. 
Even though the jury acquitted him on the lewd conduct charge, Mr. Nelson's 
case was still prejud Cf State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 716 (Ct App. 2003) ("[T]he 
Kuhn on one jury did not 
arguments.") case is distinguishable from Kuhn 
the intensity the prosecutor's misconduct was more than merely 
"calling a witness a liar." See Kuhn, 139 716. As discussed above, the prosecutor in 
the instant case vouched for the investigating officer and himself, and appealed to the 
emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury. This misconduct, being more egregious than 
misconduct in Kuhn, meant that fundamental error occurred in this case. 
Because fundamental error occurred here through the State's prosecutorial 
misconduct, Mr. Nelson's conviction must be vacated and the case must be remanded. 
See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228; Gross, 146 idaho at 22. 
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